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THE CONSTITUTION'S AMENDING ARTICLE:
ILLUSION OR NECESSITY
ROBERT G. WECLEW*
RTICLE V' of our federal constitution contains the seeds for the
destruction of the entire Constitution. It also contains poten-
tialities for expansion and modification of every power therein
contained. The use of correct procedure in proposal and ratification
could result in the destruction of all individual rights, the elimination
of the federal government, the legal disappearance of the states or any
portions of them or a complete redistribution of power.
The express limitations on the amending power, three in number,
concern constitutional modifications in the direct tax and slave trade
provisions prior to 1808 and deprivation of any state's equal suffrage
in the Senate. The direct tax and slave trade provisions having ex-
pired, the only express limitation presently operative is on equality.
If a state consents, it could be deprived of a senator. If two-thirds of
both houses of Congress proposed reducing the representation of all
the states to one senator or abolishing the states entirely, and either
proposal was ratified by three-fourths of the legislatures or conven-
tions in the states, equality of suffrage would prevail and no state could
object. The equal suffrage provision, rather than being an absolute
express limitation, is a conditional express limitation. It aims at the
inclusion of the state whose equality is diminished as a ratifier. If the
state agrees, its equality in the Senate may be reduced by amend-
ment. If the state refuses, its equality may not be reduced. Assuming
* Mr. Weclew is a Professor of Law and Acting Dean at DePaul University College of
Law. He received his J.D. at Northwestern University. He is a member of the Illinois
Bar.
1 The article reads as follows: "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Ap-
plication of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths
of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first
Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate."
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the above express limitations (two expired and one conditional on the
affected state's consent), it is difficult to find any implied limitations
following the rule that exceptions from a power determine its extent.2
Given three exceptions, virtually any other governmental power or
private right would be open to change through the amending process.
The wide spread between the attempted use of this virtually limit-
less power and its successful use becomes evident when we see that
over 5,000 amendments were proposed from 1789 to 1963,1 but as of
this date only 25 have been ratified. Of these, the first ten were
actually a supplement to the original Constitution since it was gen-
erally understood and informally agreed that a Bill of Rights would
follow.
Ratification of the first ten amendments was completed December
15, 1791. The eleventh amendment, preventing suit against a state by
citizens of another state, became effective in 1795. The twelfth amend-
ment, changing the procedure of voting for the President, was prob-
ably ratified in 1804. Except for three Civil War amendments written
during a time of crisis, there was actually no amendment for over one
hundred years until the sixteenth amendment (income tax) was en-
acted in 1913. The eighteenth and twenty-first amendments, to a cer-
tain extent, cancelled each other. The nineteenth, granting suffrage
to women was ratified in 1920, and the twentieth, changing terms of
elected federal officials, the assembly time of Congress, and presi-
dential succession was approved in 1933. The twenty-second (1951)
limited the President to two terms. The twenty-third (1961) gave the
District of Columbia the right to cast electoral votes for President.'
The twenty-fourth (1964) abolished the poll tax in federal elections.5
The twenty-fifth (1967) provided answers to the formerly trouble-
some problems of presidential inability and succession to the vice-
presidency.
AMENDMENT BY EXTRA-LEGAL MEANS
There is obviously a wide gap between the discernable need for
formal amendment and the actual adoption of select amendments as
2 Platz, Article Five of the Constitution, 3 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 24 (1934).
3 Senate Library, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, S. Doc. No. 163, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. Preface at IV (1963).
4 d. at 231-243.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
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part of the framework of our government. Yet our 7,000 word docu-
ment survives and seemingly belongs to each new living generation.'
It is a viable document that adequately serves the needs of our people,
"a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."'
While some of the draftsmen of the Constitution felt amendability
was necessary to meet unanticipated difficulties that might eventuate
from this experiment in attempting to provide stability to govern-
ment, others doubted the propriety or necessity for amendment.' Mr.
Justice Brandeis said, "A code of law that makes no provision for its
amendment provides for its ultimate rejection."' Is this true or is the
position of the doubters correct in view of the unfolding of our con-
stitutional system?
Let us assume that an amending article never found its way into
the Constitution. Although it is true that our government is one of
enumerated powers and that Congress cannot act unless under a power
expressly or impliedly conferred, implications might well arise that
amendment by the ordinary legislative methods or through the same
power by which the Constitution was originally promulgated could be
had. 10 Thus, if vitally necessary to the country's best interests, the
power of Congress to call a constitutional convention with ratifica-
tion by conventions in the states might be justified by implication;
or this might be held to be an inherent power of Congress. The Court
has said that the powers to maintain diplomatic relations with other
countries, declare and wage war, make treaties, "if they had never
been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality."" If necessary
to avert severe domestic disturbance, the Court might well find the
amending power to be an inherent power, the exercise of which is
preferable to such domestic discord as might lead to no government at
all.
The basic written document, as history has shown, may be modi-
6 CAHN, An American Contribution, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 12 (1954).
7 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
8PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 685 (1941); 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES
128-182 (1866 ed.) ; ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 2-7 (1942).
9 THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS 26 (Goldman ed. 1953).
10WILLOUGHBY, THE NATURE OF THE STATE 213 (1928); ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 9 (1939).
11United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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fled by legal means or extra-legal means. Article XIII of the Articles
of Confederation said, "nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter
be made in any of them [the Articles of Confederation]; unless such
alteration shall be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be
afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every state." Article VII
of the Constitution said it would be effective when ratified by conven-
tions in nine of the states. Contrary to the specific words of the
Articles of Confederation, the Constitution went into effect before
it was ratified by North Carolina and Rhode Island." It became
effective through revolutionary means, but had the Supreme Court
held the Constitution invalid, the Court itself would have been
invalid."
AMENDMENT USING ARTICLE V
Although it is true that "Article 5 of the Constitution contains the
only provision prescribing how it might be amended,"' 4 these pro-
visions are seldom the vehicle for change. Granted, in certain matters,
formal amendment is the answer, e.g., changing of numbers (a four
year term for the President, two year terms for representatives, six
year terms for senators), could hardly be accomplished by other than
formal amendment because of the specificity and exactness of the
constitutional provisions. They leave little room for interpretation. An
exact, unwavering meaning of a specific term that has deep roots in
history, e.g., jury, could not be abruptly changed without formal
amendment. Complex situations of a distinctly political nature, such
as presidential succession, disability, and election should be met by
formal amendment, although Congress has to some extent handled
some of the problems in this area by legislation.
Sometimes a formal amendment is needed to reverse a Supreme
Court decision. The eleventh amendment reversed Chisholm v.
Georgia.1" The fourteenth amendment reversed Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford.'6 The sixteenth amendment reversed Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
12 BURDICK, LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 34 (1922).
18 ORFiELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 9 (1942).
14 ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -388 (1939).
152 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
1660 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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& Trust Co.17 These situations represent the exception rather than
the rule. The Court seldom resists vitally strong public sentiment for
long periods of time, believing that, like politics, constitutional law is
the art of the possible.' 8
[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment
and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exer-
cised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has
long been accepted practice, and this practice has continued to this day.19
MODIFICATION WITHOUT ARTICLE V
When dealing with generalities and broad concepts, the imprecise
nature of the constitutional grants and limitations puts the Court into
a "continuous process of constitution-making."20 The elasticity and
adaptability of the commerce clause, the spending power, due process,
and the war power enable the Court, by the interpretation and re-
interpretation of such terms, to meet most problems as they arise.
The school of liberal constructionists are able to accomplish through
judicial review what the strict constructionists believed could be ac-
complished only through formal amendment. Broad concepts, un-
restrained by constitutional limitations, allow the Court to handle new
situations as they arise within the framework of the document. Much
of the successful continuity of the Court's processes has been due to
its ability to recognize and define constitutional concepts in terms of
changing political, economic, moral, and social milieus. Whether the
Court is properly recognizing and defining the concepts is often-times
a matter of divided opinion. There has been considerable criticism
directed at the Court for ignoring precedent, for legislating, and for
following its own predilections. Much of this criticism has come from
individual members of the Court itself.2 ' For example, Mr. Justice
17 157 U.S. 429 (1895) ; 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
18 MCCLOSxEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 23 (1960).
19 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
20 Maxwell, The Supreme Court in the American Constitutional System, 33 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 523, 540 (1958).
21 Kurland, The Court of the Union or Julius Caesar Revised, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW.
636 (1964). Kurland cites numerous specific criticisms by various justices of majority
action the justices deem unwarranted under the Constitution.
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Black's recent dissent from the decision finding the Virginia poll tax
invalid:
[T]here is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the Due Proc-
ess Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of the Constitu-
tion as written so as to add to it substantive constitutional changes which a majority
of the Court at any given time believes are needed to meet present-day problems.
S.. If basic changes as to the respective powers of the state and national govern-
ments are needed, I prefer to let those changes be made by amendment as Article
V . . . provides.
2 2
The Constitution contains silences, omissions, and in many in-
stances the vagueness of language that compromise brings about.
There were many matters of constitutional import that did not be-
come part of the document,2 or that could become so only by stretch-
ing the resulting powers concept, or the necessary and proper clause.
Some were deliberately left out or glossed over, so as to effectuate
the necessary degree of compromise, and therefore secure ratification
and not wreck the convention. The convention, in effect, was leaving
the solution of these matters to branches of the future government
including the Supreme Court. Removal from office, 24 creation of gov-
ernmental corporations, 25 judicial review, 26 and the acquisition of
territories" are examples of some of the silences that were later liti-
gated without their having been mentioned in the original document or
having been added by formal amendment.
OTHER FORMS OF INFORMAL MODIFICATION
Conventions and usages are matters within the general range of the
Constitution that have not been dealt with in specific provisions or
words. They have been factors in changing or modifying specific
phrases and clauses of the Constitution although the words might
remain the same. A usage is a practice of long standing or the cus-
tomary method of procedure. A convention is a permanent, fixed
22Harper v. State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-676 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
23 WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 122 (1936).
24 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
25 Supra note 7.
2 6 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
27 DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
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usage.2" The line between custom and usage is not always easy to
draw.
Vice-President Tyler, upon President Harrison's death, did not
become Acting President assuming the duties and powers of the office.
He assumed the office of President claiming his right to the office and
to the title. De jure recognition as President was accorded him. This
precedent was followed each time the President died in office, and it
became a convention modifying the Constitution to that extent.
29
Some other conventions and usages are the popular election of the
President in the states, the powers of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the party caucus, and senatorial courtesy.
Executive acts may have an amending force in the constitutional
scheme. Executive agreements with foreign nations have to some ex-
tent displaced the treaty making power. The cabinet, a creature of the
President, is both extra-statutory and extra-constitutional. 0
The necessary and proper clause, as interpreted, has enabled Con-
gress to enact a vast body of legislation of a constitutional nature,
implementing and expanding virtually every power in the Constitu-
tion, particularly the important powers such as commerce, spending,
war, postal, money and fiscal. Statutes might be said to implement the
Constitution when they assist defining the governmental framework,
or when they place in operation or expand powers conferred by the
Constitution, or when they extend the range of its operations. These
statutes are sometimes called constitutional statutes." The Judiciary
Act of 1789, the statutes creating legislative courts, and those creating
the broad network of administrative agencies fall into this category.
Two other possible forms of informal amendment might be men-
tioned at this point. Amendment through disuse of certain portions
of the Constitution has been suggested. 2 For example, certain por-
tions of the fourteenth amendment, such as the provision for political
disabilities for certain classes of citizens and the prohibition against
payment of debts in aid of insurrection, serve no useful purpose at
this time. Although enforcement may be an important ingredient in
28 WEAVER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 87 (1946).
29 RoSsiTER, TnE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 209 (rev. ed. 1959).
30 WEAVER, supra note 28, at 93.
31 Id. at 54.
32 Garrett, Amending the Federal Constitution, 7 TENN. L. REV. 298 (1930).
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our conception of the law, American law generally considers statutes
and amendments in force unless repealed by a later statute or amend-
ment.13
Amendment by acquiescence, with reference to the slavery amend-
ments, claimed to have been ratified by less than three-fourths of the
states, with some of those being coerced, has been suggested, since
such acquiescence has existed for a considerable period of time. 4 This
point becomes somewhat academic in light of Leser v. Garnett33 in
which the court said the proclamation of the Secretary of State was
"conclusive on the courts" as against objections that might be raised
as to the legislative procedure by which ratification was obtained. Four
members of the Court who concurred in Coleman v. Miller said that
the amending process "is 'political' in its entirety, from submission
until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not sub-
ject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point."36 Fur-
ther, article V is separate and independent from the rest of the
Constitution, regarding both the substance and procedure of the
amendment, and contains no implied limitations.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Assume the amending power does not and did not exist in the Con-
stitution. What about our Bill of Rights? Madison's view was that
the amendments should be inserted into the Constitution at the ap-
propriate places; e.g., jury trial provisions were to be made part of
the jury trial provisions of article III. Various provisions prohibiting
Congress from infringing upon certain rights of citizens would follow
article I, section 9, with its prohibitions against bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws.37 If there had been no amending clause, the
Constitution would not have been ratified unless Madison's views were
adopted and the amendments comprising the Bill of Rights inserted
directly into the Constitution so as to actually be a part of it. The
amending article was a strong selling point in obtaining approval of
8 3 0R.FIELD, supra note 13, at 81-82.
3 4 WILLIs, supra note 23, at 127-128.
35 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
36 307 U.S. 433, 459 (1939).
37 PRrcuTHEr, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 368 (1959).
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the original document." Against objections to the proposed docu-
ment, the compromise of amendability provided the answer. There
was a widespread demand in the state conventions assembled to ratify
the original document, that there be additions to it setting forth prin-
ciples and prohibitions, contained in what we now call the Bill of
Rights. Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia,
and New York demanded, in their acts of ratification, that a Bill of
Rights or portions thereof be made part of the Constitution. North
Carolina insisted on a Declaration of Rights and did not ratify until
late in 1789."9 Since ratification of the Constitution became condi-
tioned on congressional proposal of a Bill of Rights, the first ten
amendments may be considered as virtually part of the original
document.
Arguments were advanced that amendments were not and would not
be necessary. The body of the instrument contained numerous as-
surances of personal rights, including the right to habeas corpus, a
prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, a guaran-
tee of jury trials, a definition of treason, and the "no religious Test"
of article VI.4 0 The federal government was one of limited, enumer-
ated powers, with a division of functions, separation of powers, and
checks and balances preventing any assumption of dictatorial power.
Further, the vast expanses of the country would allow anyone to re-
move himself readily from most government frustrations.4 Hamilton
thought a Bill of Rights unnecessary in our system, since the people
retained everything they had not surrendered, and because they had
retained all and surrendered nothing contained in the Bill of Rights,
there was no need for them to specify the reservation of any rights.42
Pinckney's statement with reference to freedom of the press could
apply equally to other protections proposed:
The general government has no powers but what are expressly given to it; it there-
fore has no power to take away liberty of the press. That invaluable blessing which
deserves all the encomiums the gentleman has justly bestowed upon it, is secured
by all our state constitutions; and to have mentioned it in our general constitution
88 CAHN, supra note 6, at 11-12.
89 Garrett, supra note 32, at 295-296.
40 Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865-866 (1960).
41 PRITCHETT, supra note 37, at 367.
4 2 TiE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Hamilton).
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would perhaps furnish an argument hereafter, that the general government had a
right to exercise powers not expressly delegated to it.43
There was a strong feeling, particularly among those who disliked
a strong central government, that the Bill of Rights would guard
against federal abuse of power, and particularly the exceptionally
broad power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into effect
the other powers given to the national government." The first Con-
gress agreed with those who wanted additional assurances, and sub-
mitted to the states several amendments in the nature of a Bill of
Rights which became effective in 1791.
The second and third amendments, regarding bearing of arms and
quartering of soldiers, have had little genuine constitutional signifi-
cance. It is possible that the common law would have made effective
the procedures set forth in the third through eighth amendments, had
these amendments not been adopted.
Much of the force of the tenth amendment was lost when the Court
said:
The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was
more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state govern-
ments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that
its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exer-
cise fully their reserved powers.
45
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
There was little doubt at the time the Constitution was ratified that
a state could not be sued without its consent. There was probably no
intention to allow suits by citizens of one state against another state
under article III which says "the judicial power shall extend to . ..
controversies . . . between a state and citizens of another state."46
Hamilton did not think such a right was given.4 7 In Chisholm v.
Georgia" the Court, with one dissent, said a citizen had such a right.
433 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 256 (1937).
44 Hart, Power of Government over Speech and Press, 29 YALE L.J. 410, 412 (1920).
45 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
46 BURDICK, supra note 12, at 93.
47 THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Hamilton).
48 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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The unpopularity of the decision resulted in quick passage of the
eleventh amendment forbidding such suits.
The courts have tended to constrict the meaning of the eleventh
amendment and to reinstate Chisholm. Courts may change consider-
ably the opinion of the people as expressed in a constitutional amend-
ment. 9 Deep inroads have been made in allowing suits against of-
ficers of the state. For example, the federal courts will entertain
jurisdiction where a state officer acts without constitutional author-
ity.' Injunctions are allowed against state officials when their action
is without authority of state law or contravenes statutes or the Con-
stitution." Where a state officer acts unconstitutionally under a valid
statute, this is not a suit against the state forbidden by the eleventh
amendment.52 Where a state officer acts exceeding his authority, or
under authority not validly conferred or contrary to law, in taking and
holding land without just compensation, his illegal act can be re-
strained or an action can be maintained against him individually."
The reports are replete with cases of this type wherein it is said that
the action is not against the state and therefore does not contravene
the eleventh amendment.
AMENDMENTS REGARDING THE PRESIDENCY
The twelfth, twentieth, twenty-second, twenty-third, and twenty-
fifth amendments relate to the presidency. There are many specifics
contained in these amendments, such as exact proportions and figures,
and these could not be changed by interpretation.
Under paragraph 3, section 1 of the second article of the Constitu-
tion, each elector votes "by ballot for two persons, of whom at least
one shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves."
Although it was a notorious fact that the intention of the electors in
the 1800 election was to install Jefferson as President and Burr as
Vice-President, each got 73 votes, thereby throwing the election into
49 2 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 317 (1932).
50 Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952).
51 Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
5 2 Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
53 Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court of United States, 207 F.2d 50 (10th Cir.
1953).
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the House of Representatives. 4 Congress accordingly proposed the
twelfth amendment to replace this provision of the document. Instead
of casting votes for two persons, it provides for the casting of separate
ballots by each elector, one for the President and the other for the
Vice-President.
The first section of the twentieth amendment deals with specific
dates. The terms of the President and Vice-President end at noon on
January 20th, instead of March 4th as was the situation previously.
The terms of representatives and senators end at noon on January 3rd,
instead of March 4th. The terms of the successors to these offices
begin immediately. The House of Representatives no longer votes for
the President by March 4th as provided in the twelfth amendment.
This section of the twentieth amendment was designed to abolish lame
duck legislators and lame duck sessions of Congress. This in turn
denies defeated members of the House of Representatives the right to
cast ballots for the President if the election is thrown into the House.
Theoretically, prior to the amendment, the defeated House members
could install the defeated presidential candidate.
The Constitution specifies terms of four years for President, six
years for senators, and two years for representatives. Those in office
at the time of the amendment's adoption had their terms shortened.
This could have been accomplished only by amendment.
Under the second section of the same amendment, Congress as-
sembles at least once a year, and its meeting begins January 3rd. It had,
under the fourth section of article I, been the first Monday in
December.55
Sections three and four, which furnish more specific guidance re-
garding presidential succession, particularly where the problem arises
before the beginning of the new chief executive's term, are welcome
and helpful. Yet, the sixth paragraph of section one of article II,
although not satisfactory or sufficiently precise in the context of the
numerous politically explosive situations that might arise, was prob-
ably of a sufficiently general nature to encompass most situations
regarding the President's successor.56
54 BLACX, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47 (1910).
55 S. REP. No. 26, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-6 (1932).
56 The sixth paragraph reads as follows: "In Case of Removal of the President from
Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of
the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by
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Congress thrice legislated concerning the performance of presi-
dential duties in case of removal, resignation, death, or inability of
both the President and the Vice-President.17 These laws were basically
concerned with which cabinet members or legislative officers should
succeed and in what order. They were not concerned with the proce-
dures for a determination of the President's ability or inability by the
President and/or the Vice-President. They were not concerned with
seeking a way to fill the office of the Vice-President if it became
vacant. Informal agreements and incomplete legislation filled these
gaps, but it remained for the twenty-fifth amendment to spell out the
highest executive officer's right to the office so as to give constitu-
tionality and legitimacy to the office free of doubt. The twenty-fifth
amendment allows the President to declare himself disabled in favor
of the Vice-President who becomes acting President, until the Presi-
dent announces his complete recovery. In addition, the Vice-Presi-
dent, along with a majority of the Cabinet or such other body as
Congress may designate, can declare the President's inability. If the
President should dispute his inability, it would take a two-thirds vote
of both houses of Congress to declare him disabled. The amendment
also provides for a means of filling the office of Vice-President through
the President's nominating a Vice-President who takes office upon
being confirmed by a majority vote of both houses of Congress.
Legislation alone could probably have accomplished the objectives of
this amendment, and the legislation would probably be held valid on
the basis of "the political questions doctrine" and separation of
powers; but giving constitutional authority and guidance to questions
needing a high degree of certainty is preferable to presidential agree-
ments and legislation.
The twenty-second amendment is specific in limiting the President
to two terms. No interpretation, usage, convention, statute, or act of
the President could, without this amendment, decide that two terms
is the limit. This amendment was proposed by a conservative Congress
Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President and
Such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected." U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.
57 Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9-11, 1 Stat. 240; Act of January 19, 1886, ch. 4,
24 Stat. 1; Act of July 17, 1947, 61 Stat. 380.
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and was ratified in 1952 just before a popular, conservative President
assumed office. He thought it unwise. 58
The twenty-third amendment provides for presidential electors
from the District of Columbia. Although the District of Columbia
is treated as a state under a treaty regulating the inheritance of
property within the states of the union, 9 and as a state for the
purpose of levying direct taxes in proportion to the census,6" and is
a state within the meaning of the diversity clause,6' it could not be
treated as a state when it came to selecting presidential electors. They
must be selected by states under the twelfth amendment. The second
clause of article II provides, "Each state shall appoint, in such manner
as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to
the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state
may be entitled. . . 2" Since, of course, the District has no senators or
representatives in Congress, it would be impossible without formal
amendment to allow it any electors for President or Vice-President.
THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS
The thirteenth amendment affirmed what the Emancipation Procla-
mation and the Civil War had already brought about. Whatever may
have been accomplished by this amendment could also have been
accomplished by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. No court could lend enforcement to any agreement encom-
passing slavery or peonage.6' In deciding a segregation case under the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, the Court said: "Liberty
under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual
is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper
governmental objective."63 Slavery could never be associated with a
proper governmental objective.
58 PRITCHETT, supra note 37, at 40.
59 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
6 0 Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
61 National Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604 (1949) (concurring
opinion of Rutledge, J.).
62 Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
63 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
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The protections of the fifteenth amendment could have been at-
tained under other constitutional provisions. Article I, sections two
and four, gives Congress the right to pass laws to protect the right to
vote in federal elections once the state has established voter qualifica-
tions. 4 Equal protection and due process forbid discrimination in
many matters, including voting.
Much of the fourteenth amendment could be eliminated without
loss. The Supreme Court rendered the privileges and immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment an especially weak source for
constitutional protection in the Slaughter-House Cases.65 The second
section of the fourteenth amendment, providing for reduction in pro-
portional representation in Congress to states denying suffrage to male
inhabitants, has never been implemented. The third section of the
same amendment, denying the right to hold public office to those who
engaged in rebellion against the United States, was ultimately enforced
only against some of the better known leaders. The fourth section,
validating the national debt incurred in the Civil War, and prohibiting
a state from paying any part of its debt incurred in prosecuting the
war, or as compensation for the emancipation of slaves, has become
obsolete.66
The citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment contains an
element of specificity. The clause was made necessary by Dred Scott
v. Sandford,67 "the most disastrous opinion the Supreme Court has
ever written."68 The Court held that under Missouri law a slave re-
mains property and is not entitled to his freedom when his owner
takes him to a free state and then brings him back; he is neither a
citizen of a particular state nor of the United States; and he cannot
sue in the federal courts under the diversity clause. Under the Court's
holding, there could be no such thing as Negro citizenship. Except for
this opinion by a closely divided court, the citizenship clause, although
desirable for clarification, would not have been necessary.
The equal protection clause seeks "an equality of treatment of all
persons, even though all enjoyed the protection of due process."69 The
64Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664 (1884).
6583 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
66 HARRIs, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY at xi-xii (1960).
67 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
68 MCCLOSKEY, supra note 18, at 94.
6 9 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333 (1921).
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clause, although a valuable tool in eliminating discrimination and un-
equal classifications on the state level, is not a prohibition against the
federal government. Yet the federal system accomplishes the objec-
tives of equal protection by recognizing that "discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.""' Conceivably the
fourteenth amendment could boil down to the due process and citizen-
ship clauses.
There are few who would contend that we could or should do with-
out a form of due process to guard against arbitrary state action. If
there had been no amending article, insertion of the Bill of Rights into
the body of the Constitution would in all probability have been neces-
sary to secure ratification.71 Could the due process clause, there or in
the fifth amendment, have been made applicable against state action?
The Court in Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,72 when
called upon to decide whether the fifth amendment's due process clause
applied to the states, decided that it did not, nor did any of the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to state action. It has been said
that "the decision of the Court, and the doctrine for which it stands,
constitute, in fact, one of the most extensive and indefensible of all the
various failures of the Court to enforce the Constitution against the
states as the document is written. ' 7 3 Repeated attempts were made
to overturn this decision. The Court was asked to overturn its ruling
in Barton on seven different occasions between 1833 and 1869, and
seven times it refused to do so.7" A search for protection of certain
rights from adverse state action led to additional attempts to over-
turn Barton. There were at least twenty cases from 1877 to 1907 in
which the Court reaffirmed the Marshall ruling in Barton when asked
to deny it.75 A different ruling in any one of these cases could have
70 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
71 PRITCHETT, supra note 37, at 368.
7232 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
73 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1081 (1953).
74See O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment 1875-1876, 41 U. DET. L. J. 137, 196 (1963).
O'Brien cites the following cases: Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 546 (1833);
Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 561 (1844); Fox v. Ohio, 45 U.S.
(5 How.) 447 (1846); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71. (1855); Withers v.
Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1857); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
475 (1866); Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868).
75 Warren, The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REV.
431, 436 (1926).
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eliminated the need for the most important of all the provisions in
the fourteenth amendment, its due process clause, since a different
ruling could have made the Bill of Rights, including the due process
clause of the fifth amendment in its entirety, applicable to the states.
THE INCOME TAX AMENDMENT
The sixteenth amendment gives Congress the "power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without ap-
portionment among the several states, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." This amendment was the direct result of
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,76 which held a tax on income
from realty and personalty to be a direct tax and invalid because not
levied in proportion to the census. The Court said a tax on income
from rents is a direct tax by a five to three vote, that a tax on income
from personalty is a direct tax by a five to four vote, and that the
unconstitutional provisions rendered the entire law unconstitutional
by a five to four vote.
Prior to this time the Court, on at least five occasions beginning in
1796, had found the only types of direct taxes to be capitation taxes
and taxes on real estate. Until Pollock the right of the government
to tax income from both real and personal property had been deemed
settled. It is a matter of speculation whether the income tax amend-
ment was really necessary. Other unpopular decisions had been over-
turned in the past. Hepburn v. Griswold, 7  holding invalid Legal
Tender Acts, requiring acceptance of legal tender in payment of agree-
ments made before the acts were passed, was overruled in the Legal
Tender Cases.9
During the interim between the Pollock decision in 1895, and the ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, the Court gave evidence of a greater awareness
of the dangerous consequences to national solvency which that holding threatened,
76 157 U.S. 429 (1895) and 158 U.S. 602 (1895).
77 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), sustained a tax on carriages;
Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1869), sustained a tax on an in-
surance company's receipts for premiums and assessments; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869), sustained a tax on state bank notes; Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S.
(23 Wall.) 331 (1875), sustained a real estate inheritance tax; and Springer v. United
States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881), upheld a general tax on income.
78 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869).
79 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
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and partially circumvented it, either by taking refuge in redefinitions of "direct
tax" or, and more especially, by emphasizing, virtually to the exclusion of the
former, the history of excise taxation.80
A tax on the sale of a business exchange was held to be an excise
tax in Nicol v. Ames. 81 A tax on the heirs who received property,
rather than on the decedent's estate, was held to be an excise tax in
Knowlton v. Moore.12 A tax on tobacco in the hands of the dealer was
said to be an excise tax in Patton v. Brady. 3 A tax on corporate in-
come was upheld as an excise "measured by income" on the right to
do business as a corporation in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 4 The six-
teenth amendment ended speculation as to whether the Court, without
the aid of a constitutional amendment, would persist along these lines
until it had reversed Pollock. 5 One writer speculated in 1907 that a
new income tax law would be approved by the Court." He argued that
the Court would weigh the unanimous past income tax decisions, one
of which was substantially contemporaneous with the Constitution,
against the more recent five to four decision enunciated in a time of
political excitement. The vote of the fifth man in this closely divided
decision, he said, is an historical accident which should not impede con-
stitutional development. Each party, after each election, should be
able to reopen political controversies, thereby enabling the Court to
restore confidence in itself by restoring the Constitution to its correct
meaning. 7 There is little doubt that, even without the sixteenth
amendment, Pollock's days were numbered.
THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
The seventeenth amendment provides for the popular election of
senators. Yet, prior to ratification, the voters in many states could
designate their preference in the primaries, and the legislatures gen-
80 Small, The Constitution of the United States, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
1341-1342 (1964).
81 173 U.S. 509 (1899).
82 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
83 184 U.S. 608 (1902).
84220 U.S. 107 (1911).
85 Small, supra note 80, at 1342.
86 Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV. 280 (1907).
87 Id. at 288-290.
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erally elected the candidate of the majority.88 In two states, candidates
for legislative seats were required to support the candidate getting
the majority. 9 At least twenty-nine states by 1912, one year before
ratification, were nominating senators on a popular basis giving the
legislators little more discretion than that of presidential electors."
The trend indicated that, in a few years, practically all the states
would have required popular election of senators, whether or not the
seventeenth amendment was passed.
THE EIGHTEENTH AND TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENTS
The eighteenth amendment, prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquor, and the first section of the
twenty-first, repealing the eighteenth, would seem to negate any na-
tional power in this regard. However, the second section of the twenty-
first amendment gives the states power to regulate the transportation,
importation, possession, and use of liquors within their boundaries.
There has been a trend toward devaluation of the amendment as re-
gards state control, with emphasis instead on the state's police power
and the commerce power.9' The second section of the amendment does
not repeal the commerce clause or the export-import clause (article I,
section 10, clause 2), or act as "a limitation upon the constitutional
powers of the National Government."9
In view of the Court's modern holdings regarding Congress' plenary
power over commerce, 93 it would seem that Congress could by legisla-
tion accomplish the prohibition that the eighteenth amendment was
designed to accomplish (at least do as good a job), or Congress could
by statute give the states as much control over the liquor traffic as
Congress desired.
88 Small, supra note 80, at 1356.
89 Id. at 1356.
90 Id. at 1356.
91 Id. at 1366-1377.
92Id. at 1378.
93 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); Pruden-
tial Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
When a female claimed the privilege of voting as a privilege and
immunity of United States citizenship under the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court admitted that women were citizens but said the Con-
stitution conferred no right to vote, and that voing was not a privilege
or immunity of United States citizenship."4 Yet in 1884 in Ex Parte
Yarbrough,"5 the Court found that under the fourth section of article
I, the state's voting regulations are adopted, but the right to vote is
based upon the Constitution and Congress has the power to pass laws
to assure the exercise of that right.96
Although the Yarbrough decision applied to a Negro desiring to vote,
the broad principle could conceivably apply to women, so that classi-
fication for voting purposes based on sex could be held an unreason-
able classification, violative of both due process and equal protection,
thereby allowing the use of article I, section four of the document to
protect the right to vote. However, there had been a long, specific,
unwavering historical understanding that a state, in prescribing voter
qualifications, could exclude women from its voting lists. Change
could have been accomplished through liberal constitutional interpreta-
tion, but change through amendment was desirable and preferable.
THE TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT
The twenty-fourth amendment denies to the United States and the
states the right to use the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in a
federal election. In Harper v. State Board of Elections," the Supreme
Court held that Virginia's poll tax, payment of which was to be made
before voting in state elections, violated the equal protection clause.
The Court said that, "wealth or fee paying . . .has no relation to
voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental
to be so burdened or conditioned."98 If the right to vote, free of a tax,
is fundamental in state elections, it is difficult to find any reason why
it should not be fundamental in federal elections. Had there not been a
94 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
05 110 U.S. 651.
90 Id. at 664.
97 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
98 Id. at 670.
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twenty-fourth amendment, the Supreme Court after Harper would
have no alternative to holding the poll tax invalid in federal elections.
A parallel situation arose in two school segregation cases. In Brown
v. Board of Education,99 the Court found that segregation in the public
schools of several states violated the equal protection clause. In
Bolling v. Sharpe,100 the same type of segregation in the public schools
of the District of Columbia was held violative of the fifth amend-
ment. Although the equal protection clause is not applicable to the
federal government, there was no difficulty in finding sufficient dis-
crimination to violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
If the framers had omitted an amending article, the Constitution
probably would have survived. Conceivably the capsuled result could
be as follows. The Bill of Rights would have found its way into the
main body of the Constitution before its ratification and eventually
would have been found applicable to state action, at least in part.
Relief could be obtained against state action by citizens of another
state without the necessity of resorting to the fiction that the repre-
sentative of the state is being sued in his individual capacity.
Dred Scott and Pollock could not survive and would be overruled
by the Court. Prohibition of intoxicating liquors would present no
constitutional problem. Poll taxes in federal elections would run afoul
of the due process clause. Women would be allowed to vote. Popular
elections would, as a rule, determine the choice for senator. The
President would be entitled to as many terms as the voters think he
should have. The substance of the twelfth, twentieth, and twenty-
third amendments would have been proposed by constitutional con-
ventions impliedly authorized, or by the Supreme Court's finding of
an inherent power in Congress to call such conventions. Legislation
and agreement would provide for presidential succession, now supplied
by the twenty-fifth amendment. All this testifies to the flexibility of
this most adaptable instrument which would continue to be effective,
even without its most awesome power, the power given in the amend-
ing article to do anything except deprive a state of equal suffrage in
the Senate without its consent.
99347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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